From Raphael Satter, the AP:  The U.S. military has been launching cyberattacks against its opponents in Afghanistan, a senior officer says, making an unusually explicit acknowledgment of the oft-hidden world of electronic warfare.

Marine Lt. Gen. Richard P. Mills’ comments came last week at a conference in Baltimore during which he explained how U.S. commanders considered cyber weapons an important part of their arsenal.

“I can tell you that as a commander in Afghanistan in the year 2010, I was able to use my cyber operations against my adversary with great impact,” Mills said. “I was able to get inside his nets, infect his command-and-control, and in fact defend myself against hisalmost constant incursions to get inside my wire, to affect my operations.”

Mills, now a deputy commandant with the Marine Corps, was in charge of international forces in southwestern Afghanistan between 2010 and 2011, according to his official biography. He didn’t go into any further detail as to the nature or scope of his forces’ attacks, but experts said that such a public admission that they were being carried out was itself striking… .

The Pentagon did not immediately respond to an email seeking comment on Mills’ speech.

U.S. defense planners have spent the past few years wondering aloud about how and under what circumstances the Pentagon would launch a cyberattack against its enemies, but it’s only recently become apparent that a sophisticated program of U.S.-backed cyberattacks is already under way.

From Elinor Sloan, Canadian Defense & Foreign Affairs Institute: The clincher is the content of the generalized reference to “NATO” when we talk about a “NATO operation.” The discussion above reveals that when an operation includes a large US combat element then Canada’s experience is, relatively, a much better one than when the operation is not built on a strongly engaged US core. This is because NATO as an organization does not have many of its own assets. It has an integrated military command structure that brings together the forces placed by member countries at Alliance disposal. However, when it comes to any particular mission, countries must still agree that these forces can be deployed to theatre. In the final analysis, they are still national assets. “The biggest challenge in Afghanistan,” Fraser stated in the wake of Medusa, “is that NATO in itself has virtually none, or very little, of the combat enablers…The enablers are for the most part still owned by their contributing countries, and here in Afghanistan largely the enablers we are looking at are aviation, air and ISR, and they are still American or British… . .”

Canada’s first question when considering a commitment to a future NATO operation, argues General Labbé, must be “Who can we rely on to help us?” Caveats, he notes, are a “reality going in, driven by domestic politics”; the argument is not that there should be no caveats, but rather that they should be known in advance and accounted for in our decision making. Generals Beare and Vance concur that, in essence, there is “no point in going on about caveats.” Rather, the requirement is a wide-eyed assessment of Canada’s role and level of participation based on the commitments that countries have or have not made. “Even article V offers each nation independent action. The discretionary space now translates to out of area [operations].”

While these are all valid points, the Afghanistan case illustrates that when it comes to NATO crisis management missions—non-article V, out of area operations—we do not have to search far to find answers on when and whether to participate. For Lieutenant-Colonel Hope, who experienced first-hand working within the Alliance at the tactical level, Canada should only take part in NATO out of area combat operations if they are supported by US assets. “Canada can fight, as long as the US is there to fill the gaps.” In the personal opinion of Major General Neasmith, who worked at the operational/strategic level within ISAF, the ideal is that there be four eyes involvement, but the bottom line is core American participation. Canada should say “yes” to NATO operations “preponderantly led by the United States.”

These conclusions hold important implications for Canada when one considers the strategic guidance for the US Department of Defense released by the Pentagon in January 2012. The new strategy—indeed, its title—stresses that America will take measures to sustain US global leadership. To do so the United States will focus on a combination of high technology and small footprint approaches, that is, on a smaller, leaner military force whose capability is magnified by advanced combat enablers of the sorts that were so important in Afghanistan. Central
to the strategy, to compensate for the reduced force size, is that “U.S. forces will plan to operate whenever possible with allied and coalition forces.”

For Canada the new strategy points to both caution and opportunity. The caution involves ensuring from the outset that any future NATO crisis management operation it participates in, enjoys the core support and direction of the US government and military. The case examined here reveals there is no substitute for US leadership, vision and engagement. The opportunity lies in the fact that while America will still act in a leadership capacity, it will want, and need, dependable, capable allies that can contribute a robust combat capability. Canada—and others—will need to decide how to respond to this opportunity. “NATO is an us not a them,” Beare has underscored, “try to think about it that way.” It is easy to fall into the mindset of looking for “NATO” to provide capabilities when what we need to do is look at our own individual, national, capabilities. As we look to the future of NATO’s crisis management task, it is this sort of thinking that should frame our conceptual and concrete starting point.

Elinor Sloan is Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa, and is a former defence analyst with Canada’s Department of National Defence. (photo: hummerguy.net)

From EU NAVFOR:  On 24 August 2012 the Force Commanders from the EU Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR), NATO Operation Ocean Shield (TF-508) and Combined Task Force 151 (operated by the Combined Maritime Forces – CMF) met on board the EU NAVFOR flagship ITS San Guisto (Italian Navy) to further enhance the cooperation and coordination in the fight against piracy.

The flagships, ITS San Giusto (EU NAVFOR), HNLMS Rotterdam (NATO) and the ROKS Wang Geon (CTF-151) rendezvoused in the Gulf of Aden to allow the three Force Commanders to meet face to face.

Dutch NATO Commander Commodore Ben Bekkering and CTF-151 Commander Rear Admiral Anho Chung from the Republic of Korea were welcomed by Italian EU NAVFOR Force Commander Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino aboard the San Giusto.

The three Counter-Piracy forces coordinate their actions on a daily basis to enhance their capability and effectiveness in deterring, disrupting and counteracting piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden.  Although modern means of communications allow reliable long distance exchanges of information and a continuous flow of communications, face to face meetings are still very important.

This was the second time that the three main Counter-Piracy forces have met at sea; the first time having occurred on 23 July 2012 onboard HNMLS Evertsen (former flagship of Ocean Shield-NATO Commander).

The three Force Commanders discussed the strategic and tactical situation of piracy since the beginning of 2012 and agreed that, whilst the recent downturn in piracy off the Horn is Africa is welcomed, that military forces need to remain vigilant to further attacks by pirates on ships transiting the area.  (photo: EU NAVFOR)

From Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Graham Bowley, the New York Times:  Even as attacks by Afghan security forces on NATO troops have become an increasing source of tension, new NATO data shows another sign of vulnerability for the training mission: even greater numbers of the Afghan police and military forces have killed each other this year.

So far, Afghan soldiers or police officers have killed 53 of their comrades and wounded at least 22 others in 35 separate attacks this year, according to NATO data provided to The New York Times by officials in Kabul. By comparison, at least 40 NATO service members were reported killed by Afghan security forces or others working with them.

Both figures fall under what officials call insider attacks, and both numbers have climbed sharply over the past two years, Western officials say. But while officials say that a vast majority of attacks on Western forces are born out of outrage or personal disputes, the Afghan-on-Afghan numbers are said in larger part to reflect a greater vulnerability to infiltration by the Taliban.

Further, there are concerns about cultural clashes within the rapidly expanding Afghan forces themselves, Afghan and NATO officials say, raising questions about their ability to weather the country’s deep factional differences after the NATO troop withdrawal in 2014.

“Three decades of war can play a pivotal role in the internal causes,” said Maj. Bashir Ishaqzia, commander of the Afghan National Police recruitment center in Nangarhar Province. He said one of the biggest challenges for the army and police forces was a lasting “culture of intolerance among Afghans, as well as old family, tribal, ethnic, factional, lingual and personal disputes.”  (photo: Aref Karimi/AFP/Getty)

From George Kerevan, the Scotsman:  [A]t its Chicago summit in May, under heavy German pressure, Nato altered its so-called “deterrence and defence posture”. Instead of a traditional refusal to give a “no-first-strike” guarantee, Nato now promises never to use nuclear weapons against a country that does not possess them, and is a signatory of the UN non-proliferation treaty (that means Iran, by the way). The Chicago summit also adopted – for the first time in any military alliance – a commitment to make nuclear disarmament a constituent part of its strategy.

Bill Ramsay, the organiser of SNP CND, is not impressed. He argues the German campaign will be thwarted by the United States. But Washington cannot impose its will on the European members of Nato. General De Gaulle threw the Americans and their nukes out of France in 1966. Besides, the number of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has declined since the end of the Cold War from about 2,500 to a token 200 bombs. This compares with some 2,000 still deployed by Russia.

What Ramsay misunderstands is that Germany’s pressure to remove tactical nukes from Europe is not a one-sided demand that the US takes its bombs home. The Germans want to remove the Russian weapons at the same time. The quid pro quo for the Russians shifting theirs to the other side of the Urals is that the US’s go to Nevada. A neutral Scotland will be irrelevant to that debate. In fact, Scotland quitting the alliance now reduces Nato’s diplomatic credibility when negotiating over Russian nukes.

What are the chances of a new round of nuclear arms reduction talks between Russia and Nato? It is certainly needed, and soon. Most of the existing treaty obligations to cut warheads and do on-site inspections are now legally time-expired. Or, in the case of the US’s unilateral (and destabilising) withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty, redundant. Russia has threatened to withdraw from the 1987 INF treaty abolishing short and medium-range missiles. Which means it could add nuclear tips to its new, highly accurate, highly mobile Iskander missile system – the replacement for the infamous Scud rocket. The Iskander was used (with conventional warheads) in Georgia in 2008, when the Russians invaded. No-one these days thinks a nuclear war in Europe is a realistic possibility. But Russia’s invasion of Georgia (which has a population the size of Scotland), and its cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007, are proof positive Moscow thinks it can bully small countries and get away with it. Russia keeps tactical nukes as a diplomatic big stick.

Pretending Nato is solely to blame for nuclear weapons is naïve. Pretending an independent Scotland that repudiated Nato could fend off Russian bullying in the oil-rich North Atlantic is a dangerous gamble. And pretending a majority of Scots will vote for independence plus neutrality is political fantasy.

Getting Moscow (and Washington) to the negotiating table will be difficult. But I think Scotland should be part of making it happen. Independence, after all, is not about leaving the UK. It’s about joining the world.  (photo: Royal Navy)

From Phil Stewart, Reuters:  Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has recommended GeneralJoseph Dunford, the No. 2 Marine officer, to lead the war effort in Afghanistan once the outgoing commander of U.S. and NATO troops rotates out of the post, a U.S. official told Reuters on Wednesday.

The decision will ultimately rest with President Barack Obama and his nomination would need to be approved by Congress.

Dunford, who served in the Iraq war, would replace General John Allen, who took over command of the Afghan mission in July 2011 and who is expected to become the next head of U.S. forces in Europe sometime this winter.

From John T. Bennett, U.S., News & World Report:  Dunford, a Massachusetts native, has been a Leatherneck since 1977, after he graduated from the private St. Michael’s College in Vermont.

He held a number of leadership posts, eventually becoming a senior aide to several senior Marine Corps leaders. Dunford has commanded the I Marine Expeditionary Force and U.S. Marine Corps Central Command.

Dunford caught the attention of many in Washington for his performance as the head of the 5th Marine Regiment during the 2003 Iraq invasion, where he reportedly earned the nickname “Fighting Joe” from his then commander, Gen. Jim Mattis. (photo: AP)

From Joerg Wolf, Atlantic-Community.org:  The heads of state and government of the NATO member states had three priorities in Chicago: the mission in Afghanistan, military capabilities and international partnerships. Atlantic Initiative surveyed 32 German experts between May 23rd and June 7th from think thanks like the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, the German Council on Foreign Relations and the European Council on Foreign Relations; from universities in Hamburg, Berlin and Munich; and from media sources like Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Augen Geradeaus and the Global Europe… .

A large majority of those surveyed had lower expectations for the Smart Defense initiative. Secretary General Rasmussen wants to respond to the financial crisis with a renewed culture of cooperation. Member states should strengthen their military capabilities through multinational solutions and more efficient investments.

Nevertheless, none of the experts are of the opinion that the initiative will become the new way in which NATO does business by “building capabilities together”. Only one in five experts surveyed think the initiative will ‘produce innovation but not until at least five years from now’; this was the second positive option available. The negative assessments prevailed: 17% believe Smart Defense would provide an excuse for the allies to make further defense budget cuts, and 33% claim it will mask NATO’s inability to make necessary reforms. Moreover, the results of the experts who selected “Other Answers” are overwhelmingly skeptical as well; altogether 72% of those surveyed could be considered pessimistic and only 19% as optimistic.

An international group of 60 experts, who were asked the same question by the Atlantic Council and the magazine Foreign Policy in the lead-up to the Chicago Summit, were clearly more optimistic. There were just as many positive assessments of the Smart Defense initiative as negative ones.

The majority of those surveyed believe that NATO’s priority of strengthening international partnerships was achieved to some extent in Chicago (53%). Almost as many of those questioned (47%), however, are of the opinion that the Alliance was not at all able to do this.

Two-thirds of the foreign policy experts consider the Chicago Summit to be “partly successful”. A quarter of them view the Summit to be “not very successful”, although only one participant considered it a failure.

Above all, the experts judge the display of unity to be NATO’s biggest success, followed by the decisions on Afghanistan and missile defense, which can also be counted as a Smart Defense project. The declaration of the interim missile defense’s capability is the concrete summit decision, which met with the most approval from the experts. The reason for missile defense being labeled a success has less to do with technical progress, and more to do with the fact that the declaration went through despite massive pressure from Russia. In addition, the declaration will now be difficult to reverse.

Joerg Wolf is editor-in-chief of atlantic-community.org.  (graphics: Atlantic-Community.org)

From Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, Wall Street Journal:  The U.S. is planning a major expansion of missile defenses in Asia, a move American officials say is designed to contain threats from North Korea, but one that could also be used to counter China’s military.

The planned buildup is part of a defensive array that could cover large swaths of Asia, with a new radar in southern Japan and possibly another in Southeast Asia tied to missile-defense ships and land-based interceptors.

It is part of the Obama administration’s new defense strategy to shift resources to an Asian-Pacific region critical to the U.S. economy after a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. …

A centerpiece of the new effort would be the deployment of a powerful early-warning radar, known as an X-Band, on an undisclosed southern Japanese island, said U.S. defense officials. The Pentagon is discussing that prospect with Japan, one of Washington’s closest regional allies. The radar could be installed within months of Japan’s agreement, American officials said, and would supplement an X-Band the U.S. positioned in Aomori Prefecture in northern Japan in 2006… .

Officials with the U.S. military’s Pacific Command and Missile Defense Agency have also been evaluating sites in Southeast Asia for a third X-Band radar to create an arc that would allow the U.S. and its regional allies to more accurately track any ballistic missiles launched from North Korea, as well as from parts of China.

Some U.S. defense officials have focused on the Philippines as the potential site for the third X-Band, which is manufactured by Raytheon Co. Pentagon officials said a location has yet to be determined and that discussions are at an early stage.

The beefed-up U.S. presence will likely raise tensions with the Chinese, who have been sharp critics of U.S. ballistic missile defenses in the past. Beijing fears such a system, similar to one the U.S. is deploying in the Middle East and Europe to counter Iran, could diminish China’s strategic deterrent. Beijing objected to the U.S.’s first X-Band deployment in Japan in 2006. Moscow has voiced similar concerns about the system in Europe and the Middle East… .

Analysts say it is unclear how effective U.S. missile defenses would be against China. A 2010 Pentagon report on ballistic missile defenses said the system can’t cope with large-scale Russian or Chinese missile attacks and isn’t intended to affect the strategic balance with those countries.

The senior U.S. official said the new missile defense deployments would be able to track and repulse at least a limited strike from China, potentially enough to deter Beijing from attempting an attack… .

Mr. [Steven] Hildreth of the Congressional Research Service said the U.S. was “laying the foundations” for a regionwide missile defense system that would combine U.S. ballistic missile defenses with those of regional powers, particularly Japan, South Korea and Australia.

U.S. officials say some of these allies have, until now, resisted sharing real-time intelligence, complicating U.S. efforts. Territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan have flared anew in recent weeks, underlining the challenge of creating unified command and control systems that would be used to shoot down incoming missiles.

The U.S. has faced a similar problem building an integrated missile-defense system in the Persian Gulf… .

The Navy has drawn up plans to expand its fleet of ballistic missile-defense-capable warships from 26 ships today to 36 by 2018, according to Navy officials and the Congressional Research Service. Officials said as many as 60% of those are likely to be deployed to Asia and the Pacific.

In addition, the U.S. Army is considering acquiring additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, antimissile systems, said a senior defense official. Under current plans, the Army is building six THAADs. (graphic: Wall Street Journal)

From Thomas Wright, the Washington Quarterly:  Western Europe has been an integral part of the U.S.-led international order since its foundation in the years after World War II. NATO’s greatest role was undoubtedly in waging a successful cold war against the Soviet Union while consolidating democracy in Western Europe, but it continues to play a central part in international politics. In recent years, NATO has spearheaded interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and North Africa. Politically and diplomatically, Europe and the United States form a powerful constituency for openness, democracy, and human rights on the world stage, even if they occasionally disagree about how to pursue these goals.

If Europe fails, the transatlantic pillar of the international order would begin to crumble. In the relatively benign scenario of bare survival, Europe would turn inward as it became  reoccupied politically, economically, and diplomatically with tackling its own existential crisis. Under such conditions, it is hard to see how Europeans would be willing to play a truly global role in world affairs. Even if they did, military budgets would continue to drop under the constraints of austerity, and the capabilities gap with the United States would widen. Europe’s soft power, which optimists have long pointed to as the European Union’s real contribution to world politics, would be decimated as European-style integration became a warning to be avoided, not a model to be emulated.

If failure takes the form of a disorderly collapse, the outcome would be immeasurably worse. As Europe reels from the shock of historic proportions, the United States would have to cope with a rapidly worsening geopolitical climate, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa, and China, but also in a number of fragile states around the world. The demand for international leadership and crisis management would skyrocket at precisely the time when a pillar of the West is in a state of collapse. The United States would be compelled to go it alone while Americans would undoubtedly be angered and frustrated at what they would accurately perceive as a European crisis that could have been avoided had better decisions been taken earlier on… .

Failure in Europe would shake the world. Whether the reverberations are modest or seismic would depend on whether the failure is within existing structures or shatters them beyond repair. The former scenario would ensure Europe becomes less relevant, a coarsening of politics inside the continent, less effective governance over global issues, and the continued relative rise of the rest.

This would be contrary to the interests of the United States and the European Union, but it pales in comparison to the effects of a disorderly collapse which could include a global depression, an end to institutionalized cooperation in Europe, rising populism, potential crises inside China and Middle Eastern countries, and the end of the transatlantic alliance. Although the gap between these two scenarios is great, the difference in the probability of each may be quite small, resting on key political decisions and the impact of various shocks.

Thomas Wright is a fellow with the Managing Global Order at the Brookings Institution.  (graphic:ValueWalk)

From Derek S. Reveron, the New Atlanticist:  As Cyber Command matures, it tends to dominate national cybersecurity discussions. Ellen Nakashima’s reporting notes coordination across the government occurs, but an anonymous official sees “DOD has the responsibility to defend the nation” crowding out the civilian departments of the government. Given how military commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as warfighters, we should expect to see the military lead on cyber issues.

As cyber issues are increasingly securitized through law and integrated into national security bureaucracies, we must not overlook how cyberspace is different from land, air, and sea. The most important distinction is the essential role the private sector plays in creating, sustaining, and innovating in the cyber field. The world largely runs on Windows, people connect through Facebook, and Google is both a multi-billion dollar company and a verb. In spite of this, Jason Healey notes that governments must:

Break the fifteen-year public-sector/private sector stalemate.The need for information sharing and trust between the government and private sectors has been well known since before 1998, when US President Clinton issued a decision directive calling for cooperation. Yet nearly fifteen years later, the same findings surface in every exercise and report and are met with the same platitudes and saccharine commitments and action plans.

Recognizing the centrality of the private sector is fundamental. While cyber offense is king, cyber defense can be improved through better cyber hygiene by users and changing the incentive structure to reduce software vulnerabilities by producers. Just as there are regulations and fines governing use of the environment to reduce pollution, it might be time to explore ways for governments to impose costs on companies that enable intrusions through vulnerable software. Allowing the military or national security bureaucracy to dominate policy discussions will likely be insufficient in the cyber age.

Derek S. Reveron, an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is a Professor of National Security Affairs and the EMC Informationist Chair at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. (photo: Reuters)