From Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Project Syndicate:  Many years ago, I took my children to visit the sites of the D-Day landings in Normandy. I wanted them to understand the sacrifices that others had made so that Europe and North America could enjoy the benefits of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We saw the beaches whose names echo through history – Omaha, Utah, Juno. Those beaches remain a memorial to the idea that, together, we can overcome any threat, no matter how great.

We understand the future that could have befallen not only Europe, but the entire world, if North America had not helped Europe in its hour of need. And we know that those landings created a unique bond between our continents.

That bond remains vital for the preservation of our values and our security. But, after the Cold War, many assumed that its institutional embodiment – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – would fade away. It did not, because our bond is based not just on common threats, but on shared ideals. It could no more fade away than our desire for freedom could wane. NATO needed no external reasons to exist. Yet history would provide them soon enough.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO intervened to stop massive human-rights violations. In Libya, we enforced a United Nations Security Council resolution to protect civilians. And in Afghanistan, we are denying a safe haven to extremists.

The Alliance has evolved into a true security-management organization that is flexible, efficient, and cost-effective. The threats have changed, and become more global, and we have changed to meet them.

NATO is developing a ballistic-missile defense capability to protect our European populations and territory against a grave and growing threat. In the Indian Ocean, NATO is working with the European Union and many others to police major sea lanes threatened by pirates. And, in countries around the world, it carries out tasks such as de-mining, disaster relief, advising on how to bring military forces under democratic control, and working closely with the UN to prevent harm to children.

Efforts like these may not make headlines. But security is like health – you never notice it until it takes a turn for the worse. This is why you need insurance. And NATO is the most solid security insurance that the world has. Underwritten by 28 members, it has delivered security benefits to all Allies, year after year, for more than six decades.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen has been Secretary-General of NATO since 2009. He was previously Prime Minister of Denmark.  (photo: thefrenchwillneverforget.com)

From Kurt Volker, the Christian Science Monitor:  In 1993, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher began consultations with European allies to gauge their level of support for military force. But instead of assuring that the United States was prepared to lead the charge, he asked allies whether they were prepared to implement the plan, without committing the US either way. (“Leading from behind” is what one might call this today.)

Sensing the US was not prepared to lead implementation – President Clinton had won the election just six months earlier on the slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid” – allies demurred.

Within a week, the Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the plan, and shelling resumed. The war raged for two more years, with the Bosnian enclaves of Gorazde and Zepa falling to ethnic Serb forces, their majority Bosniak populations forcibly expelled.

Then, in July 1995 in Srebrenica, Bosnian Serbs murdered more 7,000 Bosniaks in one, systematic slaughter. It was at that point that the West finally acted. To his lasting credit, President Clinton then determined that the US would lead. NATO used air power to suppress Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo, and within months had committed to military implementation of the Dayton peace accord, driven to conclusion by American über-diplomatRichard Holbrooke. By December 1995, some 60,000 NATO troops were en route to Bosnia to implement the peace plan, 20,000 of them American.

What was the difference between May 1993 and July 1995? In terms of Western implementation – nothing. We did in 1995 roughly what we would have done in 1993, had we acted. But in terms of human cost – tens of thousands of lives were lost.

And that is the key lesson. Eventually, the West was willing to act. But it took a “catalyst” of thousands of lives lost in a single massacre to convince us to do what we could have done years before. Would it not have been better to have acted sooner and saved thousands of lives?

As we look back over recent decades, there have been a surprising number of mass-murder conflicts. Bosnia, Kosovo, Saddam Hussein’s attacks on the Kurds in Iraq, and Libya, to name a few. In each case, outside powers intervened at some point to stop the killing. The results – while imperfect – nonetheless saved thousands of lives and laid the groundwork for future settlements.

And of all these recent conflicts, which is the one we regret the most? Rwanda, where some 800,000 people were killed and the West did nothing.

This is the perspective one must bring to the conflict now raging in Syria… .

What is missing, therefore, is not an understanding of the case for intervention, or even a means to intervene, but a “catalyst” that justifies and forces action. If that catalyst occurs, the US and others might act. And then America and its friends should ask themselves why they did not act sooner, and prevent the very catastrophe that spurred them into action.

Kurt Volker, a former US ambassador to NATO, is a professor of practice at Arizona State University and a senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.  (photo: Getty)

From Kate Brannen, Defense News:  At the upcoming May NATO summit in Chicago, Sen.John McCain, R-Ariz., wants world leaders to address Syria and NATO expansion.

Speaking at an event on Capitol Hill hosted by the Atlantic Council, McCain, an outspoken advocate for a U.S.-led intervention in Syria, said it was shameful that NATO has done nothing while the government of Bashar al-Assad continues to violently suppress civil unrest in the country.

“Is it now the policy of NATO that we will stand by as rulers kill their people by the thousands, and our alliance won’t even discuss what we might do to help stop them?” McCain said. “This is shameful.”

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has said that NATO has no current plan to intervene in Syria and that he does not envision one taking shape… .

For McCain, this strategy falls short of what he sees as NATO’s commitments.

“Shame on us and shame on the alliance, if we neglect our responsibilities to support brave peoples who are struggling and dying in an unfair fight for the same values that are at the heart of our alliance,” he said.

McCain said he’d also like to see NATO members use the opportunity in Chicago to discuss growing the alliance to include countries like Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Georgia.

“We hear it said that this will not be an expansion summit,” McCain said.

“That is regrettable. We must make it clear to all of these countries, and any other country in Europe that wants to be a part of NATO and can meet the criteria, that the path to membership is open to them.”

Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, speaking at the same event, said it should be remembered that NATO is not a gift, but a responsibility. New partners need to add to the strength of the alliance and not detract from it, she said.  (photo: AP)

From Carlos Munoz, DEFCON Hill:  As the Pentagon gets smaller, the U.S. military is going to need more help from its friends around the world. 

New legislation introduced Thursday by Rep. Michael Turner (R-Ohio) is geared toward expanding that circle of friends, particularly in Eastern Europe. 

The NATO Enhancement Act of 2012 would lay the groundwork for Bosnia, Georgia, Macedonia and Montenegro to join NATO.

It would also make those former Soviet satellite states eligible for military assistance by the United States and NATO members, “including the sale of defense articles and services,” according to the proposed legislation… .

The legislation would not authorize any new U.S. assistance programs and will not increase the current levels of foreign aid being provided to these countries already. 

If signed into law, the bill would require the State Department to provide an update to Congress on the steps taken to get those four Eastern European countries into the alliance.   (photo:Reuters)

From Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO:  Two years ago, at the EU Defence Ministers’ meeting in Palma de Mallorca, I made several proposals to address this problem. I said that the EU and NATO must have regular discussions, at all levels, on the entire spectrum of common security threats. That we need to work together more closely in operations. And that we must get a higher return on our defence spending through reducing duplication and using scarce resources more efficiently.

To achieve these goals, I suggested a “two-way street” approach. On the one hand, all EU members should be able to participate in NATO-EU cooperation. And on the other hand, the EU should reinforce its political and military relations with those NATO Allies who are not members of the EU. This would include an overall security agreement between the EU and Turkey. And an arrangement between Turkey and the European Defence Agency.

These proposals are still on the table. But, frankly, not much progress has been made.

And let me be clear:
We cannot defend to taxpayers our inability to find ways to combine our efforts, seek efficiencies, and deliver better results.

On the ground, our soldiers and civilian experts have learned to cooperate – because they must. Their mission depends upon it. And so do their lives. But in Brussels, we are still prevented from having formal talks between NATO and the European Union on any subject other than Bosnia. That makes no sense.

As our operations have multiplied, the need for cooperation has only grown. NATO’s mission in Libya is a case in point. While some European Allies - and one non-Allied member of the EU - shouldered heavy burdens. The operation also demonstrated significant shortfalls in a range of European capabilities – from smart munitions, to air-to-air refuelling, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.

We have seen some welcome steps to address these shortfalls. One is the initiative by Denmark for joint acquisition and stockpiling of weapons and ammunitions. That should help participating countries save money while ensuring that the munitions are readily available when they are needed.

I am also encouraged by the progress that the European Defence Agency is making on pooling and sharing. And I particularly welcome the leadership of the European Defence Agency in addressing the European shortfall in air-to-air refuelling. This is a critical capability. And if European nations manage to deliver in this area, that will benefit both the EU and NATO.

In the end, we must be pragmatic. The European Union and NATO have 21 members in common. But each of those nations has only one set of tax-payers, one set of armed forces and one set of capabilities. We need to get the most out of those forces and capabilities. That will benefit our organisations, our taxpayers, and our security.

We must strive to consult and cooperate more often. And we must ensure that our organisations complement each other. At the very least, regular meetings must become part-and-parcel of the way we operate. So the pragmatic approach that we have seen on operations translates into greater political pragmatism back in Brussels. If our soldiers can do it, so can we… .

We know what we need to do. But politically, doing nothing is sometimes easier than doing what is necessary. We all know how powerful inertia can be.

The common threats we face don’t suffer from political inertia. They are on the move — fast. Terrorism. Weapons of mass destruction. Piracy. Cyber attacks. And many others.

To confront these threats, we need to work together. And to do this successfully, we need a stronger NATO-EU relationship.

Excrepts from speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to the chairpersons of the foreign affairs committees of the European Union member’s states parliaments, Copenhagen.   (photo: Reuters)

From Aida Cerkez, the AP:  “Safe havens” for civilians in Syria? Think twice, Bosnians would warn.

With the U.N. unable to agree how to protect civilians against Bashar Assad’s forces, Western officials are discussing creation of safe corridors to deliver aid to Syrians trapped by the crackdown.

Similar measures failed badly during the war in Bosnia two decades ago that killed over 100,000 people and left millions homeless. The lesson of Bosnia is that without all sides honoring the agreement — and without a robust military response in case they don’t — such measures may have little effect and could actually prolong the misery.

In 1993, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution that declared six cities in Bosnia as “safe havens” for civilians and deployed military observers to monitor the situation.

The U.N. protected zones in places like the capital of Sarajevo or the eastern enclave of Srebrenica in effect became prisons, subject to relentless shelling by Bosnian Serb forces that often denied they were responsible. The U.N. never managed to get enough aid through the corridors and smugglers made fortunes… .

Those safe havens actually lengthened the 1992-95 war.

Instead of stopping the bloodshed, they simply reduced it to a politically acceptable level. It enabled both the attackers and the resistance to continue fighting.

Without a quick political settlement, neither side could achieve victory and both staved off decisive defeat. It was not until Serb forces overran Srebrenica in July 1995 that the West could no longer sit and watch and deployed troops to stop the carnage.

The enclave fell after senior U.N. commanders rejected a request by a few hundred Dutch peacekeepers deployed in Srebrenica for air strikes and its Muslim Bosnian residents swarmed a U.N. military base, still believing the Dutch would protect them.

But outnumbered and outgunned, the U.N. peacekeepers allowed the Serbs to separate women and children from men and execute some 8,000 males in what later became known as the worst massacre in Europe since World War II.

Hans Blom, who oversaw a Dutch government-commisioned investigation into the Srebrenica massacre, said he is “very pessimistic” about what the international community can do in Syria. He voiced skepticism over the U.N.’s concept of “safe zones” or “safe areas,” calling it a very vague notion and difficult to enforce… .

Blom said that for now he doesn’t see a role for international peacekeepers in Syria because there is no peace to keep and any humanitarian workers who were to enter the country would face massive violence. Only a massive military intervention could stop the violence, he argued.

“Only if there is a very determined outside force willing to use military means, it’s maybe possible,” he said. “Interventions are a very complicated thing. And the terrible thing, of course, is that doing nothing is as bad.”

From Jim Drape, the Air and Space Power Journal:  Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the French have intervened in many conflicts in Africa and have courageously fought alongside Americans in nearly every recently assembled coalition, including the first Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—with the notable exception of Iraq. However, despite jokes to the contrary, French opposition to the second Iraq war had nothing to do with cowardice, stemming instead from confidence in their intelligence sources, which had concluded that Saddam Hussein didn’t possess weapons of mass destruction. Thus, they pushed for further weapons inspections to bear this truth out, arguing that Saddam did not pose the immediate threat portrayed by the American administration.

Currently, the French have the fourth largest contingent in Afghanistan and, correspondingly, have had the fourth largest number of servicemen die in the conflict—78 to date. Beyond Afghanistan, France is one of the few countries with air force bases outside its territory, having them in strategic hot spots such as Djibouti as well as the United Arab Emirates, directly across the Strait of Hormuz from Iran. Finally, and perhaps surprising to many people, the French air force capably led the coalition’s enforcement of United Nations Resolution 1973, which called for a “no-fly zone” over Libya to protect the civilian population.

In addition to these efforts at the national level, one can reflect on two recent events that highlight individual acts displaying both American and French courage in the current conflict in Afghanistan. Recently, Gen Norton A. Schwartz, the Air Force chief of staff, awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross with valor to a young French major in the 41st Rescue Squadron from Moody AFB, Georgia. During a deployment to Afghanistan, the major gallantly launched as part of a four-ship task force sent at night to rescue a British casualty whose injury put the lives of 160 British soldiers in jeopardy. Evading rocket-propelled grenades, he successfully rescued not only that soldier but also another, enabling the ground unit to complete its mission.

Three days previously, under the austere backdrop of the forward operating base in Kapisa, French brigadier general Emmanuel Maurin, commander of French ground troops in eastern Afghanistan, awarded three American Airmen the French National Defense Medal for their heroic actions during a nighttime helicopter rescue of two French airmen whose Gazelle attack helicopter had crashed in inclement weather. Dispatched to find the downed pilots, they dropped off their rescue crew, who found the French pilot waving a strobe light but unable to move his legs. The crew then found the copilot, still strapped to his seat, which had dislodged and slid to the back of the helicopter. The 37-year-old veteran of conflicts in Croatia, Kosovo, and the Ivory Coast was valiantly struggling to breathe, so the Airmen made a small incision in his neck and inserted a breathing tube. The helicopter ferried the two injured men to the hospital at Bagram Airfield. Although the pilot survived and is expected to walk again, tragically, the copilot died, leaving behind a widow and four children in France.

As these vignettes poignantly demonstrate, the French serve courageously beside their American allies in Afghanistan, and in some cases, like the French copilot, they die pour la patrie (for the homeland)… .

In this new era, we don’t have the luxury of dismissing those with whom we disagree as “mere irritants” or branding them the enemy. As emphasized in the recently released national defense strategy, the United States must partner with its European allies. Yes, we need the French. Through professional military education, American Airmen have become familiar with Sun Tzu, who wisely wrote that to win a war, one must know the enemy. But in this new post-9/11 era, in which fiscal realities and the diverse nature of the threat necessitate a network of global partnerships, it is perhaps more important—and at times even more difficult—to understand our allies. As articulated by Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley and General Schwartz in the “2011 US Air Force Global Partnership Strategy:”

The impacts of the global economic crisis, violent extremism, shifting regional balances of power, and the proliferation of advanced technologies will characterize the future security environment, making it unlikely for any one nation to address every global challenge and priority alone. With this guidance, we are increasing our emphasis on developing access and relationships with international partners while forging coalitions to meet both current and emerging global strategic challenges. Successful partnership development optimizes interoperability, integration, and interdependence between coalition forces while providing our partner nations the capability and capacity to resolve national security challenges on their own merit.

As the Le Monde editorial observed, both France and the United States realize that what unites them, such as common democratic values, necessitates a vibrant partnership to meet the challenges of this new era. We need to move beyond our stereotypes in order to build a strong and lasting partnership with France.

USAF Colonel Jim Drape serves as an exchange officer to the French Air Staff, assigned to the Strategic Affairs Division of the Centre d’études stratégiques aérospatiales.  (graphic: Jean-Pierre Heim/Le Courrier de l’Architecte)

From the Office of John McCain:  [A]t the request of the Syrian National Council, the Free Syrian Army, and Local Coordinating Committees inside the country, the United States should lead an international effort to protect key population centers in Syria, especially in the north, through airstrikes on Assad’s forces. To be clear: This will require the United States to suppress enemy air defenses in at least part of the country.

The ultimate goal of airstrikes should be to establish and defend safe havens in Syria, especially in the north, in which opposition forces can organize and plan their political and military activities against Assad. These safe havens could serve as platforms for the delivery of humanitarian and military assistance – including weapons and ammunition, body armor and other personal protective equipment, tactical intelligence, secure communications equipment, food and water, and medical supplies. These safe havens could also help the Free Syrian Army and other armed groups in Syria to train and organize themselves into more cohesive and effective military forces, likely with the assistance of foreign partners.

The benefit for the United States in helping to lead this effort directly is that it would allow us to better empower those Syrian groups that share our interests – those groups that reject Al-Qaeda and the Iranian regime, and commit to the goal of an inclusive democratic transition, as called for by the Syrian National Council. If we stand on the sidelines, others will try to pick winners, and this will not always be to our liking or in our interest. This does that mean the United States should go it alone. We should not. We should seek the active involvement of key Arab partners such as Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Jordan, and Qatar – and willing allies in the E.U. and NATO, the most important of which in this case is Turkey.

There will be no U.N. Security Council mandate for such an operation. Russia and China took that option off the table long ago. But let’s not forget: NATO took military action to save Kosovo in 1999 without formal U.N. authorization. There is no reason why the Arab League, or NATO, or a leading coalition within the Friends of Syria contact group, or all of them speaking in unison, could not provide a similar international mandate for military measures to save Syria today.

Could such a mandate be gotten? I believe it could be. Foreign capitals across the world are looking to the United States to lead, especially now that the situation in Syria has become an armed conflict. But what they see is an Administration still hedging its bets – on the one hand, insisting that Assad’s fall is inevitable, but on the other, unwilling even to threaten more assertive actions that could make it so.

The rhetoric out of NATO has been much more self-defeating. Far from making it clear to Assad that all options are on the table, key alliance leaders are going out of their way to publicly take options off the table. Last week, the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Rasmussen, said that the alliance has not even discussed the possibility of NATO action in Syria – saying, quote, ‘I don’t envision such a role for the alliance.’ The following day, the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral James Stavridis, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that NATO has done no contingency planning – none – for potential military operations in Syria.

That is not how NATO approached Bosnia. Or Kosovo. Or Libya. Is it now the policy of NATO – or the United States, for that matter – to tell the perpetrators of mass atrocities, in Syria or elsewhere, that they can go on killing innocent civilians by the hundreds or thousands, and the greatest alliance in history will not even bother to conduct any planning about how we might stop them? Is that NATO’s policy now? Is that our policy? Because that is the practical effect of this kind of rhetoric. It gives Assad and his foreign allies a green light for greater brutality.

Excerpt from remarks by Senator John McCain on the situation in Syria on the floor of the U.S. Senate.  (photo: Reuters)

US Senator John McCain Calls For Air Strikes on Syria